Choosing a first focus area is one of the most consequential decisions a new research institute makes. It shapes your partnerships, your credibility, and the kind of evidence you will spend years building. When we decided to focus on crime, violence, and public safety, the decision came from three specific reasons. None of them are abstract.
1. Nigeria's security situation is at an all-time low, and it is affecting everything
This is not a niche problem. The deterioration of public safety in Nigeria is affecting livelihoods, economic activity, movement, and the basic ability of communities to function. Farmers cannot work their land in some regions. Businesses cannot operate. Families are displaced. The consequences spread far beyond crime statistics.
When a problem is this pervasive and this consequential, it deserves serious, rigorous attention. Too much of the response to Nigeria's insecurity has been reactive, politically driven, or based on incomplete information. We believe better data, in the hands of the institutions responsible for public safety, can change that.
2. It is a hard problem that many are running from — which means the potential for impact is real
Security sector work in Nigeria is not easy. Institutions are under pressure. Trust between communities and security agencies is fragile. The political environment is complex. Many researchers and development organisations steer clear of it for exactly these reasons.
We think that is precisely why the potential for impact is high. Where attention is scarce and evidence is thin, a credible, co-created data tool can make an outsized difference. We are not interested in working only in the areas where the path is already well-worn. The harder the problem, the more a well-designed, evidence-based intervention can shift things.
3. We have the experience of building tools with government at the highest levels, even when it is difficult
This is not our first time working inside Nigerian government institutions. Our co-founders have built data systems and analytical tools with public agencies at senior levels, navigating the real constraints of institutional bureaucracy, limited IT capacity, and political complexity. We know what it takes to get a tool adopted. We know where things break down. We know how to build something that survives.
That experience is directly relevant to security sector work. The same dynamics that make data tools fail in other institutions apply here. And the same principles that make them succeed apply too. We are not approaching this as outsiders hoping for access. We are bringing a track record of working at the highest levels of government, even when the terrain is difficult.
These three reasons together point to the same conclusion: this is where we can do our best work, and where our best work is most needed. That is why we chose it.